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The human capacity for good and compassion
makes the death penalty tragic; the human capacity for
evil and depraved behavior also makes the death penalty
necessary.2
Rape is “one of the most egregiously brutal acts
one human being can inflict upon another,”3 and has
been described as a “fate worse than death.”4 Child rape
is perhaps the worst crime one can commit, arguably
second only to murder.5 It was not until the mid-1980s
that the media brought child sexual abuse to the nation’s
attention as a serious issue.6
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided that sen-
tencing a defendant to death for the crime of rape vio-
lates the eighth Amendment because it constitutes
punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the crime
committed.7 For more than thirty
years, the constitutionality of classi-
fying child rape as a capital crime
has been questioned.8 The Court re-
cently ended the ambiguity in
Kennedy v. Louisiana by determin-
ing that the death penalty is an inap-
propriate sanction for child rapists,
where the victim is left alive.9
This article explores the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty for
the crime of child rape, focusing
specifically on Louisiana’s capital child rape statute.10
Part II briefly outlines the Supreme Court’s child rape
decisions.  Part III examines the practical and theoretical
problems associated with using capital punishment in
the context of child rape.  Part IV suggests ways to
amend child rape statutes to provide for the death
penalty in a way that does not violate the eighth Amend-
ment. 
The Supreme Court Holds that Capital Pun-
ishment in Cases Where the Victim is an Adult is
Unconstitutional
Pre-Coker v. Georgia
eighteen states, the District of Columbia, and 
the federal government allowed the use of the death 
penalty for the rape of an adult woman in 1925.11 Al-
most fifty years later, that number had barely de-
creased.12 In Furman v. Georgia,13 the Court held that
the death penalty as imposed in the cases before the
Court constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  As a
result of the decision, states with capital rape statutes
were forced to reconsider and revise their statutes so as
not to be arbitrary and capricious.14 Although states
began to reinstate the death penalty after Gregg v. Geor-
gia,15 only Georgia, north Carolina, and Louisiana
maintained rape as a capital crime.16
Coker v. Georgia  
In 1974 ehrlich Coker was
sentenced to death after being con-
victed of the rape of a sixteen-year-
old woman.  Section 26-2001 of the
Georgia Criminal Code provided
that “(a) person convicted of rape
shall be punished by death or by im-
prisonment for life, or by imprison-
ment for not less than one nor more
than 20 years.”17 Defendant Coker
argued that the state statute violated
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
Amendment, and the Court agreed.18 Following the
Coker decision, states followed suit and revised their
rape and death penalty statutes to reflect the holding.19
Between 1989 and 1995 no jurisdiction in the
united States authorized the death penalty as punish-
ment for the crime of rape.20 however, this changed in
1996 when Louisiana passed its capital rape statute and
sentenced Anthony Wilson and Patrick Bethley to death
for raping a child under the age of twelve.21 The
Louisiana capital rape statute made the death penalty a
potential punishment for aggravated rape of a child
under the age of thirteen.22  
Capital Child Rape in Louisiana Courts
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Introduction
Child rape is perhaps the
worst crime one can com-
mit, arguably second only
to murder.5 It was not until
the mid-1980s that the
media brought child sexual
abuse to the nation’s atten-
tion as a serious issue.6
Prepping the United States Supreme Court for Ju-
dicial Review of Capital Punishment
for Child Rapists
State v. Wilson23 was the first case after Coker to
challenge a child rape statute.  In 1995, Anthony Wilson
was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated rape of a
five year old girl.24 his case was consolidated with that
of Patrick Dewayne Bethley, who was charged with rap-
ing three girls under the age of ten, including his daugh-
ter.25 Defense counsel moved to quash the indictments
arguing that imposing the death penalty for the crime of
rape would constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the eighth Amendment to the Constitution.26 The
trial courts in Wilson and Bethley’s cases agreed with
the defense on the grounds that the punishment was ex-
cessive and the class of eligible defendants had not been
sufficiently limited.27 The State appealed both cases to
the Louisiana Supreme Court which held that “in the
case of the rape of a child under the age of twelve, the
death penalty is not an excessive punishment nor is it
susceptible of being applied arbitrarily and capri-
ciously.” 28 The united States Supreme Court denied
certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction because Bethley
had not been convicted or sentenced to death when the
challenges were made.29
Recently the Supreme Court reconsidered the
issue of capital punishment for child rapists in its deci-
sion in Kennedy.  In 1998, Patrick Kennedy was charged
with aggravated rape of a victim under the age of
twelve: his eight-year-old stepdaughter.30 The State of
Louisiana sought the death penalty and the jury subse-
quently found the defendant guilty.31 In the penalty sen-
tencing phase, the jury unanimously recommended a
death sentence.32
Could it merely have been a coincidence that the
more liberal justices made up the majority of the Coker
Court that found the Louisiana statute unconstitu-
tional?33 Coker noted the importance of the Justices
looking beyond their own opinions to more objective
factors.34 Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal proclaimed
that the five liberal justices who voted the statute un-
constitutional did “not share the same ‘standards of de-
cency’ as the people of Louisiana.”35 naturally, Justices’
personal opinions will affect their judicial decisions.36
In Coker, dicta of the majority suggest a trend toward
abolishing the death penalty. 37 The Court’s decision in
Kennedy both embraces Coker’s instruction to look to-
ward objective factors and appears to continue the trend
toward the outright abolition of the death penalty in the
united States. 
Is The Death Penalty Proportionate to The Crime
of Child Rape?
The Coker Court seemed to approach the death
penalty with the theory of “an eye for an eye,” finding
that the death penalty is appropriate for murder, but
not rape.38 Past decisions where the death penalty has
been sought in non-homicide cases have subsequently
been determined to be unconstitutional.39
Is the United States Evolving Towards Putting Child
Rapists To Death?
The concept of “[cruel and unusual] must draw
its meaning from evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”40 Coker ex-
plored the issue of whether the “evolving standards of
decency” doctrine leads states which allow capital pun-
ishment to extend it to child rape cases that do not in-
volve homicide.  The Court stressed that the Louisiana
statute should be judged by “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”
and not the standards that existed when the eighth
Amendment was adopted.41 The Court concluded that
“there is a national consensus against capital punishment
for the crime of child rape.”42 In reaching that conclu-
sion, the Supreme Court looked to objective factors such
as “public attitudes concerning a particular sentence his-
tory and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the re-
sponse of juries reflected in their sentencing
decisions.”43
Legislative enactments
Since 1995, several states have attempted to pass
legislation providing the death penalty as a potential
sentence in child rape cases;44 few have been success-
ful.45 In calculating the number of states with capital
rape statutes, the Court in Kennedy ignored states with
pending capital child rape legislation.46
Recent Supreme Court death penalty decisions
have looked to foreign countries in determining evolv-
ing standards of decency.47 Rape is punishable by death
in China, egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan,
uganda, united Arab emirates, and the former uSSR.48
China, Iran, Jordan, Mongolia, the Philippines, uganda,
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Was the Decision in Kennedy the Right One?
and uzbekistan are the only foreign countries that utilize
the death penalty to punish child rapists.49 The more de-
veloped countries of the world are largely absent from
that list.  Thus, although the Kennedy Court omitted any
discussion of international opinion,50 the result of the
case would likely have been the same; the death penalty
is excessive for the crime of child rape in developed
countries.
The Court thought it had rid its hands of the
issue of capital child rape in June 2008 with the Kennedy
decision, until an article in the new York Times51 noted
that on the weekend after the ruling, Marine Corps Re-
serve Colonel Dwight Sullivan wrote in a blog about the
Court’s failure to discuss the military penalty for rape
in the uniform Code of Military Justice.52 Once notified
of the omission, Louisiana petitioned the Court for a re-
hearing to consider the military capital child rape statute
enacted by Congress.53 On October 1, 2008, the Court
denied the state of Louisiana a rehearing on the matter.54
Acting Solicitor General Gregory Garre argued
that the actions by Congress and the President were “the
emerging ‘national consensus’ supporting - not opposing
- capital punishment in child rape cases.”55 In his opin-
ion, Justice Kennedy seems to suggest that military law
has no place in the Court’s discussion of sentencing
civilians to death as the military world and civilian
world are two discrete spheres.56 however, in his dis-
sent, Justice Antonin Scalia questions how a soldier
could be sentenced to death for raping a child, yet a
civilian could not.57
In addition to questioning the distinction be-
tween military and civilian treatment of the death
penalty for child rape, Scalia also asserts that states that
categorically prohibit the death penalty should not be
counted when determining whether there is a national
consensus in favor of imposing the death penalty for a
certain crime.58 Fourteen states punish twenty-one dif-
ferent crimes with the death penalty.59 If the Court had
considered the non-homicide death penalty jurisdictions
along with the child rape death penalty jurisdictions,
Louisiana’s statute would have had a better chance of
surviving constitutional muster, as simply an additional
non-homicide death penalty law.  On the other hand
even though those jurisdictions have such statutes they
have not been enforced,60 and thus the result may have
been the same.
history and Precedent
         Since 1964, the united States has not executed
anyone for a crime that did not result in the death of the
victim.61 Kennedy notes that since 1964, only two indi-
viduals have been sentenced to death for child rape.62
In light of the Supreme Court holdings discussed above,
some prosecutors have chosen not to seek the death
penalty in child rape cases.63 For instance, in the case
of Rodolfo Lopez Velazquez, a convicted child rapist,
the prosecutor did not seek the death penalty because he
was under the impression that Coker controlled and that
the death penalty was unavailable as a sanction.64 how-
ever, when Coker struck down the death penalty as a
punishment for rape, the main rationale behind the rul-
ing was that the survival of the victim does not justify
killing the rapist.65 Similarly, the Court stated in
Kennedy that “the death penalty can be disproportionate
to the crime itself where the crime did not result, or was
not intended to result, in the death of the victim.”66
         That said, the Kennedy Court repeatedly noted the
following distinction:  although Coker found that the
death penalty for raping an adult woman is unconstitu-
tional, it did not necessarily exclude the death penalty
for child rape.67 Indeed, in his dissent Justice Samuel
Alito speculated as to why states do not pass laws mak-
ing child rape a capital crime,68 whereas the majority
found it unnecessary to do so.69 The Court found that
in recent years some states have moved toward using
such a punishment; however, the change has been in-
significant.70 The Court compared the forty-five juris-
dictions that prohibit the death penalty for child rape to
“the 30 States in Atkins and Roper and the 42 States in
Enmund that prohibited the death penalty under the cir-
cumstances those cases considered.”71 In citing Atkins,
the Court recognizes that “[c]onsistent change [in sup-
port of the death penalty for rape] might counterbalance
an otherwise weak demonstration of consensus,”72 how-
ever, the Court found no such consistent change.73
Public Attitudes
Public attitudes toward imposition of the death
penalty are “an expression of society’s outrage at par-
ticularly offensive conduct.”74 Although states may be
increasingly tough on those who rape children,75 that
does not necessarily mean that the constituents of those
states approve of the death penalty for child rape.  What
society thinks is acceptable can also be judged by the
response of juries.76 however, the mere fact that a jury
does not recommend a death sentence for a defendant
does not mean that the jury believes that the crime the
defendant committed should not be punishable by
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death.77 Instead, juries reserve the death penalty for
those individuals they feel deserve it the most.78 In
doing so, jurors must evaluate the facts presented about
the defendant to determine “whether in this instance so-
ciety is justified in killing him.”79
Considering the Severity of the Death Penalty as a
Punishment for Child Rape
A punishment is excessive
and therefore unconstitutional under
the eighth Amendment if it “(1)
makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more that the
purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering; or (2) is
grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime.”80 A punish-
ment is also excessive when it “serves no penal purpose
more effectively than a less severe punishment.”81 If a
juror believes that a death sentence is too severe and the
court is likely to impose such a sentence if the defendant
is found guilty, the juror may decide to vote to acquit in
order to avoid the defendant’s execution.82
Would the Death Penalty Deter Would-
Be Child Rapists?
A sentence may be cruel and unusual punish-
ment, even if it “may measurably serve the legitimate
ends of punishment.”83 however, a sentence is not in-
valid simply because it does not serve the legitimate
ends of punishment.84 The majority in Kennedy points
out that there is no significant proof that the death
penalty will deter individuals from committing child
rape.85 There is no method to measure the number of
individuals who would be deterred from committing
child rape by the potential imposition of the death
penalty.86 The death penalty could serve deterrent pur-
poses or it could have no effect at all.87 Some individu-
als are more prone to commit violent crimes than others,
“given the same objective motives and equal prospects
of punishment.”88
The existence of the death penalty for child rape
gives rapists no incentive to leave their victims alive
since they could easily dispose of the best, and often the
sole, witness to the crime.89 The Louisiana Supreme
Court rejected Patrick Kennedy’s policy argument that
upholding the statute will “encourage a rapist to murder
his victim.”90 Child rapists will therefore have to make
the conscious effort to kill their victim.91 By imposing
the death penalty on a child rapist, the courts will essen-
tially be punishing the rapist for making the decision not
to kill the child.92 It sends a mixed message:  “We will
kill you if you rape a child” and “Kill the child if you
wish because you will receive the death penalty either
way.”  Therefore, without the death penalty, child rapists
may be more inclined to kill the vic-
tim.
The national Association of
Social Workers (nASW), having
filed an amicus curiae brief in sup-
port of Petitioner Patrick Kennedy,
believes that Louisiana’s aggravated
rape law undermines “the scourge of
sexual violence against children and
aiding its victims”93 because “rather
than protecting children, this statute
will increase the number of victimized children, encour-
age offenders to kill their victims, and interfere with vic-
tims’ healing process.”94
The death penalty is not necessary to achieve the
deterrent objective if a punishment less severe than
death will serve the same purpose.95 For example, the
possibility of receiving a sentence of life without parole
could be an effective deterrent.96 Advocated for criminal
defendants fear that guilty defendants will plead to the
charges simply to avoid the death penalty, while inno-
cent defendants will go to trial, “[risking] death to de-
fend themselves at trial.”97 however with life without
parole as the alternative, this would not pose a serious
problem because although the public may wish to have
the defendant executed, he is removed from society, and
therefore he or she will no longer pose a threat to chil-
dren.
Are Child Rapists Part of the “Most Deserving”
Capital punishment is reserved for “those of-
fenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most se-
rious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes
them ‘the most deserving of execution.”98 The Supreme
Court in Coker v. Georgia, compared the impact of rape
on a victim with the impact of murder on a victim. In
doing so the Court concluded that the death penalty
would violate the Constitution in child rape cases.99 The
Court emphasized that the life of a rape victim is not be-
yond repair.100 nevertheless, some commentators argue
otherwise.  They note that while any existing physical
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The existence of the death
penalty for child rape gives
rapists no incentive to leave
their victims alive since
they could easily dispose of
the best, and often the sole,
witness to the crime.89
wounds may heal, the psychological effects of child-
hood sexual abuse will last a lifetime.101 Though rape
is not as final as murder, it is certainly an atrocious crime
that outrages society.  In Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice
Kennedy opines that questions of morality come into
play when considering banning the death penalty in
child rape cases.102 namely, he states that “there are
moral grounds to question a rule barring capital punish-
ment for a crime against an individual that did not result
in death.”103 In determining whether child rapists are
the “most deserving,” Justice Alito implies that the ma-
jority in Kennedy misplaced its focus by considering the
eighth Amendment.104 he states that the amendment is
meant to protect an accused’s rights, not to determine
whether the punishment in question is “in the best inter-
ests of crime victims or the broader society.”105
Louisiana’s Capital Child Rape Statute As Written
Was Arbitrary and Capricious
A capital statute must distinguish between those
who deserve the death penalty and those who do not.106
A bright-line rule for the death penalty would not be ra-
tional in child rape cases.107 In Coker, Justice Powell
referenced Snider v. Peyton,108 which discusses the “de-
gree of culpability of rapists.”109 he highlights that in
some cases, a rapist may be more vicious than a mur-
derer,110 emphasizing the severe and aggravated nature
of rape.111
A death penalty statute may “not be imposed
under sentencing procedures that [create] a substantial
risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner.”112 There are certain standards that must
be met.  First, the sentencing judge must have adequate
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to use as
guidelines.113 Second, the statute must sufficiently nar-
row the class of defendants eligible for the death
penalty.114 These standards can be met in two ways:  (1)
the statute may narrow the definition of capital offenses
or, (2) the statute may broaden the definition of capital
offenses and narrow jury findings of aggravating cir-
cumstances at the penalty phase.115 The death penalty
may not be enforced infrequently such that the punish-
ment becomes arbitrary.116
The two aggravating circumstances for the cap-
ital crime of child rape in Louisiana are the victim’s age
and the fact that the offense was rape or attempted
rape.117 The Court in Kennedy denied additional nar-
rowing aggravators as a possible option to bring child
rape statutes within death penalty jurisprudence.118 Pres-
ident Barack Obama disagrees with the Court’s unwill-
ingness to make an exception based on the brutality of
the attack.119 Obama believes that “if a state makes a
decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined cir-
cumstances, the death penalty is at least potentially ap-
plicable, that does not violate our Constitution.”120
Justice Roberts believes that the law was narrow enough
in limiting the availability of the death penalty to those
who rape victims under the age of twelve.121 In a sepa-
rate opinion in Coker, Justice Powell suggests that the
death penalty would be proportionate for rape if the of-
fense was “committed with excessive brutality or [if]…
the victim sustained serious or lasting injury.”122
The Court’s ruling in Kennedy v. Louisiana im-
plied that no crime but murder should be punishable by
death.  Although most would agree that the Coker and
Kennedy decisions outlaw the use of the death penalty
in child rape cases, others do not see the Kennedy deci-
sion as an end to the crusade.123 If proponents of the
death penalty for child rape do wish to continue the bat-
tle, they will have to help create statutes that will with-
stand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court.  Proponents
can do so by adding aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances and developing techniques to help reduce or
even eliminate innocent executions.
South Carolina recently passed a statute provid-
ing that first-time child rapist is not eligible for the death
penalty.124 If the united States Supreme Court were to
review South Carolina’s statute prior to the Kennedy
case, the Court could very well have held that the statute
is constitutional because it is tailored to avoid the sub-
stantial risk of imposing the death penalty arbitrarily and
capriciously.125
Aggravating Circumstances State Legislatures
Should Consider
The extremely broad Louisiana child rape statute
had no provisions for requirements such as corrobora-
tion or prior convictions of sexual assault.
Rapist is Carrying a Life Threatening Disease
Faced with hIV-positive defendants and defen-
dants with AIDS, would opponents of the death penalty
for the crime of child rape view death as disproportion-
ate to the crime if the child contracts the fatal disease
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from the rapist?  Although the death may not be imme-
diate, the rapist will undoubtedly be the proximate cause
of the eventual death of the child.126 Louisiana does not
allow the death penalty under a felony-murder theory,127
but it would be interesting to see if it would accept the
hIV-positive status of a defendant as an aggravating cir-
cumstance rising to the level of felony-murder.128
Prior Record of Conviction of Sexual Offense
Capital punishment could potentially deter oth-
ers from committing rapes after being convicted the first
time.129 Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion
in Coker called attention to the fact that the defendant
was already serving a lengthy prison sentence.130 Addi-
tional prison time would have “no incremental punitive
effect” because Coker has a life pattern such that he
“presents a particular danger to the safety, welfare, and
chastity of women . . . [such that] the likelihood is there-
fore great that he will repeat his crime at the first oppor-
tunity.”131 Thus, in theory, capital punishment would
have a deterrent force on the habitual offender because
once convicted, he would have no other opportunity to
commit rape.
Mitigating Circumstances Legislatures Should
Consider
A Mental Disease/Illness
Should we punish a person by death if he or she
is committing child rape because of a mental illness?
Several states provide for involuntary civil commitment
of sexually violent predators whereby the State confines
individuals who are determined to be a threat to society
if they are released after imprisonment.132 If the condi-
tion is treatable or curable, should we treat those defen-
dants like the mentally incompetent and stay the
execution until they regain competency?
Prior Victimization
Many sexual assault offenders were sexual as-
sault victims prior to offending.133 Offenders who have
a history of being sexually abused as a child have a
lower degree of culpability as they do not always realize
the impropriety of sexual misconduct.134 Being a past
victim of sexual abuse, though mitigating, would not
constitute absolute protection from prosecution.  The
victim-turned-offender is still responsible for his or her
actions and his or her victim nevertheless deserves jus-
tice.
The Rapist is a Family Member
When it comes to juvenile victims, over thirty-
four percent of individuals who rape children are family
members of those children, and approximately fifty-nine
percent are acquaintances.135 Allowing the death penalty
for child rape may make already reluctant children less
likely to report sexual assaults.136 even if a child does
report the assault, the child may be easily persuaded to
recant the allegation by family members.137 Opponents
argue that imposing a rape sentence on a child rapist that
is related to the victim by blood or marriage, would be
“undeniably counterproductive and will not serve any
legitimate penal purpose for the State of Louisiana.”138
Protecting the Innocent
One reason that juries generally may decide not
to impose the death penalty is a lack of irrefutable
guilt.139 There is a need for heightened reliability in cap-
ital cases “to guard against the risk that an innocent de-
fendant might be put to death.”140 The testimony of
children may be unreliable because they are susceptible
to suggestion,141 may confuse fantasy with reality,142 and
often recant their allegations.143
The national Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (nACDL), as amici curiae in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, stresses the lack of reliability of children as
witnesses because of factors such as their vulnerability
to suggestion and the withdrawal of their allegations.144
Although this is a valid point to consider, it should not
be given much weight because juries also undoubtedly
weigh the credibility of the testifying child victim
against the accused.145 Children may be unable to dis-
tinguish between imagination and reality,146 and this
weakness leaves these young witnesses vulnerable to at-
tacks on their credibility.  As much as juries would like
to believe children, they tend not to lend credence to
children over adults,147 despite the fact that the alleged
sex offender has the most to gain by falsifying his or her
testimony.  In Kennedy, Justice Alito addressed the reli-
ability concerns regarding child witnesses and suggests
a corroboration requirement supported by precedent.148
Innocence Review Commission
As with any person charged with a crime, there
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is always a possibility that the person is innocent.149 So-
ciety relies on juries to find guilt correctly in capital
cases so as not to execute an innocent person.150 In order
to decrease the likelihood of executing an innocent per-
son, states may adopt an innocence review commission
similar to north Carolina’s review commission.151 how-
ever, the existence of an innocence review commission
may cause jurors to use a standard lower than beyond a
reasonable doubt because they believe the commission
will catch their  mistakes.152
The death penalty has the potential to be propor-
tionate for child rape in the manner for which Louisiana
provides.  If a state chooses to rebel against the Kennedy
ruling and pass a capital child rape statute, then the
statute must be narrowed such that only those who truly
deserve it will receive the death penalty.153
The Court’s decision in Kennedy begs the ques-
tion:  if the death penalty is not acceptable for any type
of rape—which is a crime against a person—then is
there any justification for sentencing someone to death
for a crime against the State?   Because child rape is
often viewed as second to murder as the most heinous
crime,154 The Kennedy decision could be used by de-
fense counsels to argue that their clients should not be
executed for a non-homicide crime.  unless states start
passing legislation capitalizing non-homicide crimes
and sentencing to death defendants who did not kill any-
one, such statutes will suffer the same fate as the one
that originally sentenced Patrick Kennedy to the death
penalty.  The Supreme Court would then be forced to
announce clearly that only murderers will be executed
and create another landmark case in death penalty ju-
risprudence.
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